JAMES A. GRAASKAMP COLLECTION OF TEACHING MATERIALS

- V. INDUSTRY SEMINARS AND SPEECHES SHORT TERM
 - C. Focus on Appraisal Reform
 - 2. Communication with the Real Estate Industry
 - Transcription of Graaskamp's testimony to the Subcommittee on Commerce,
 Consumer and Monetary Affairs, February 29, 1988. Also includes his handout to the committee and miscellaneous articles on the need for reform

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Congress of the United States Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives

J-29-88

For: Proj. James D. Granskamp

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HEARING ON H.R. 3675, THE REAL ESTATE
APPRAISAL REFORM ACT OF 1987
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1988
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer
and Monetary Affairs
Committee on Government Operations
Washington, D.C.

Committee Hearings

of the

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



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RPTS RILEY ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, Ltd. 3 4 **HG0056050** 5 HEARING ON H.R. 3675, THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL REFORM ACT OF 1987 6 7 THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1988 House of Representatives 8 9 Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer 10 and Monetary Affairs Committee on Government Operations 11 12 Washington, D.C. 13 14 15 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 o'clock 16 a.m., in Room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, the 17 Honorable Doug Barnard, Jr. [chairman of the subcommittee] 18 19 presiding. Present: Representatives Barnard, Spratt, Craig, and 20 21 Inhofe. 22 Subcommittee Staff Present: Peter S. Barash, staff 23 director, Faye Ballard, clerk. 24 Full Committee Staff Present: Russell Mathews, minority 25 professional staff.

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1123 recommendations that you are making are going to be very, 1124 very seriously considered.

I have no personal objections to licensing corporations. 1126 Now I know that everybody that works for Price Waterhouse 1127 and Arthur Andersen and I could go on and on are not CPAs.

They operate computers and they do a lot of other things but the material that they finally get to that proper individual in those corporations, when that signature goes on it, that is what makes the difference so I have no 1132 problem with that.

We have a vote on the Floor and I think it would be a good time to recess just briefly. Thank you all very briefly for being with us this morning.

Mr. BARBATELLI. Thank you.

Mr. KERSLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. BARNARD. The Committee stands in recess for ten 1139 minutes.

[Recess taken.]

Mr. BARNARD. The subcommittee will please come to order. Our next witness this morning, I think, in some circles could be better identified as Mr. Real Estate for he is professor James Graaskamp who is Chairman of the Real Estate and Urban Land Economics at the University of Wisconsin, the Graduate School of Business.

I had the pleasure of knowing Professor Graaskamp now for

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several years and I can certainly say that I admire him. I certainly respect his knowledge and understanding of the real estate field. He conducts seminars all over the country and recently I had the pleasure and honor of being with him in Atlanta, Georgia at a seminar that he conducted for the Georgia State University.

So Professor Graaskamp, I certainly want to welcome you to these hearings and we look with interest in hearing from you as to your opinions of this legislation.

1157 STATEMENT OF JAMES GRAASKAMP, CHAIRMAN, REAL ESTATE AND
1158 URBAN LAND ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, GRADUATE
1159 SCHOOL OF BUSINESS.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Thank you, sir, and I would like to welcome you to those of us who have been trying to reform appraisal for about 25 years. My mentor and my first Ph.D. was in real estate under Richard Radcliff who was regarded as the preeminent theorist in the last several decades in appraisal theory. My second Ph.D. is in risk management which seems to cover exactly the subject matter that we are talking about here.

We come to this with whole hearted endorsement of your legislation. We feel that ultimately it should be extended to other aspects. A major area of government guaranty is in the pension area and that is, of course, involving more and more real estate where appraisal practices also need review.

But that industry is attempting to review them on their own. We headed up the research for the Pension Real Estate Association on appraisal practice, policy and protocol for those who management those funds as well as those who do the appraisal. and they are moving toward an industry standard via a letter of engagement since there are probably only approximately 200 appraisers who they feel are

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1182 qualified to do large scale investment properties, which says 1183 something about the state-of-the-art.

My credentials in addition to being an academic_which in real estate circles one has to live down, is that we run our own appraisal group called Landmark Research. We do litigation from coast to coast, and we do that and my wife tells me that probably we are not a profit making organization, we are simply an extension of the education 1190 process. that to get the attention of the major societies, we have to beat their leading people in court in order to establish methodology and practice.

We have seen the quality of appraisals decline as sophistication of real estate has increased steadily over the last 20 years and only in the last two or three years has there been any significant response.

For example, the American Institute of Real Estate 1198 Appraisers had not issued a single white paper on a single appraisal question from about 1951 when they did one on subdivisions until two years ago when they finally addressed the issue of how to appraise for securities prospectix or a limited partnership and so forth.

There simply has been no industry leadership for responding to the appraisal side of issues of financial information as there has been in the accounting side.

Let me give you one very simple example. Appraisal is in

the business of forecasting. They have no definition of forecasting nor what are the rules that would apply to that process.

A very basic principle in accounting is that a forecast requires a range estimate in which all elements of the range be plausible and supported. that if, in fact, you are going to deal with hypotheticals, ''if then'' kinds of statements, you are doing a projection and a projection is only permitted to have limited circulation to a client where the accountant would be present to answer questions.

If, on the other hand, the accountant is preparing a forecast which will have general circulation, where presumably those that may rely on it are not there to address questions directly to those that prepared it, he is not permitted to use hypothetical assumptions, and yet virtually every appraisal we are talking about in terms of income properties that have gone awry for lenders have been based on appraisal projections in which hypothetical assumptions were used and the appraiser has always hidden behind the fact that gee, if you bought my assumption on page one, then my conclusion is valid even if the assumption itself were insane."

Now they are encouraged to do that by a lending fraternity that has always been anti-appraisal. Obviously, an appraisal chills the deal as far as the lending officer is

1232 concerned and there is a considerable bias against the 1233 appraisal unless it is a controllable appraiser.

That is a word which the major bank lending officers use all the time. A major bank said that to me just the other day and I couldn't believe that they would use that word while I was around. An appraiser should be controllable.

It is exactly the opposite of the function that he is supposed to perform.

Isn't it ironic that at the closing, the lender requires at least one percent of the loan fees for an insurance premium in case the collateral should burn down, but would never require that they spend one percent of the project to that find out if it would rent up and yet the real collateral is will it rent up.

There is a total anti-appraisal bias. Indeed, the recent language in the collapse of R-41C, I think, is really significant. In the recent repudiation of R-41C based, of course, on the CEBA legislation, Chairman Dennis Wall made an incredible statement.

In repudiating R-41C he said, "'It wasn't cost effective and competitive with the bank's appraisal standards" and yet the banks have no appraisal standards and the President of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers said so directly.

Now what is cost effective? If you have just lost \$25

billion dollars and the FSLDIC is broke and they are going
to lose another \$25 billion dollars because as Mr. Crawford
pointed out so beautifully that each of those projects eats money
while you sleep, what is cost effective if it doesn't mean
spending adequate money to do a professional job of
appraisal and using the appraisal as a legitimate portion of
the underwriting process.

Currently, it is used simply as a CYA document in case the auditor should ask if you had one. Neither are the auditors trained in the banking business to read an appraisal knowledgeably.

Now I would submit that while many of you think that this legislation is punitive on the appraiser, I would suggest instead it is a curb on the banker. I would suggest that it would be the only defense of the appraiser against his client because he can go back and say, "I can't do it that way. My certification and my living depends upon me doing it this way and this way is going to take so many people hours to accomplish and is going to cost you so much to get the job done' and now the appraiser can be truly independent because he has a rock on which he for exercise professionally.

Currently he can't do that. The minute he stands up to a lender, he loses the job, he doesn't get asked back, and very quickly he is out of that particular business. It is a

Gresham's law going on which drives the good appraiser out
of anything that has to do with lending and related
enterprises thereto.

That industry is not driven by market demand for space which is the specialty of the appraiser. It is driven by the fees and the commissions and profit centers of the short term owners of those properties and the risk is being borne by the Federal government and ultimately the taxpayer.

The loan program approved by FSLDIC is a bandaid on a gaping wound and sooner or later you, in Congress, are going to have to find \$50 billion dollars to recapitalize FDIC and FSLDIC. It is as basic as that.

Now I realize it is un-American to regulate from the Federal government, that risk is a part of doing the American way American business, but in this case the risk is being taken by the Federal government, by FSLDIC and FDIC.

It another basic tenet of business that I learned at my father's knee, that those who pay the piper get to call the tune. You are going to pay the piper for \$50 billion bucks and therefore, the Federal government gets to call the tune. It is basic.

Now I would be happy to answer questions because I can go مسلم معلم on عبد appraisal reform for days.

[The prepared statement of James Graaskamp follows:]

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Mr. BARNARD. I appreciate that, Professor. In your
outline which you have shared with us and you have covered a
lot of this, you have covered most of it, I was interested
in your response to the arguments in opposition to the
legislation.

I think you probably covered all that I had any questions on.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. If I could, I would like to comment on several of those.

Mr. BARNARD. All right. Let me ask you this question first. Professor, some have suggested that the appraisal abuse problem should be left to each of the 50 states and that because the Federal government does not certify doctors, lawyers or accountants that we should not have federal certification requirements for appraiser. How would you respond to that statement?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Well, there are multiple responses to that. First of all, I think it should be clear that almost all of the real estate organizations other than a few of the more enlightened appraisal organizations are opposed to this because it is going to impose on their commissions, fees and so forth.

The American Bankers Association, the National Association of Realtors, the Mortgage Bankers Association, the National Association of Home Builders would all find their style

curbed as it should be by this legislation. They are extremely effective at the state level.

Almost all of them have direct access to the governor's office and the governor's office would be those appointing whatever agencies will implement this at the state level. They will gut this issue and delay it and dilute it at the state level and you are going to end up with 50 different rules.

Now that is totally unrelated to the fact that real estate finance is now totally detached from the property. Real estate finance is a national and international market in which a standard set of financial data should be available and, which there is a standard way of doing business.

This has made, of course, a tremendous difference in the residential area as we have already seen. The securitization of the commercial area is coming on us very quickly and I would suspect that most of the institutions which are regulated under this particular law will not keep any more than 25 percent of the loans that they make, that, in fact, they will be securitized and sold off across the country.

That, is absolutely critical that there be a standardized appraisal process underlying that securities market which moves across not only state lines but national boundaries as well.

To leave that to a 50-state group in which the parochial interests of the small trade organizations in those states that which have embedded political organizations would be foolhardy. The appraisal industry has no political base, no political clout, no political sophistication which is one of the reasons they are where they are now.

Mr. BARNARD. Mr. Craig.

Mr. CRAIG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Graaskamp, I have not only appreciated your testimony, I have looked through your combined comments and it is always exciting for me to be with someone like you who obviously has a great grasp of the problem and the general issue.

We just don't have any disagreement. I do have some concerns because I think we both see the problem. The extent to which this Committee has worked to expose the problem has been extensive and we know what the problem is.

I think maybe we differ on how we arrive at a solution and we don't differ all that much because I recognize the responsibility of the Federal government as it relates to its own risk or the risk it assumes.

I guess the difference comes in how you approach it. Let me ask you this question with this explanation. I think we all recognize the extent, is involved in finance or at some arm of finance in this country.

We also, my Chairman and I tend to disagree on how we got

the CPAs to where they are today. Be that as it may, we do
recognize that the CPAs got to where they are because the
Federal government or an entity of the Federal government
set a standard or standards and said, ''If you want to play
the game, you play to this standard or you don't play.''

Mr. GRAASKAMP. I think there is a good model there. In the securities area, the SEC came down on the standard because the CPAs were dilly-dallying.

Mr. CRAIG. That's right.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. And embarrassed them, and rather than be embarrassed again, they got their act together and passed these rules.

Mr. CRAIG. But they didn't license, did they? They just established a standard and said, "Do you want to play in our ballpark and our ballpark happens to be so big and so powerful that you are not going to play unless you play there, you have to play by these standards."

Mr. GRAASKAMP. In one small sector, right.

Mr. CRAIG. Professor, I guess my concern is because the Federal government is so involved with a phenomenal liability to the tunes of the billions of dollars you have referred, if we are so all powerful, is it not possible for us to set a minimum standard for all of these entities involved and say, ''That is the way the game will be played if you want to play with us'' and is it not possible then

1408 that those 50 entities would have to at least establish that 1409 as a minimum standard?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Well, I am not sure that that is not what
you are doing by creating this Federal interagency group
with the two groups, one to establish the standards and one
to establish the certification process.

Mr. CRAIG. And one to conduct this certification process until such time.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Well, I think the certification process is that the states have a certain time to be responsible and if they don't, then the Federal Interagency has the power to go forward and impose that and I think that it is a very intelligent way to go about it.

Mr. CRAIG. Well, that is where we disagree but I thank you for your testimony. It was very valuable.

Mr. BARNARD. I believe you wanted to respond briefly on some of the other aspects of your testimony.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Yes. Your question was why appraisers if doctors, lawyers and accountants were not necessarily Federally licensed, I think there are several reasons for that.

One, the damage that each of them can do at the individual level, there is a basic limit and currently there is an adequate malpractice or malfeasance insurance program available for which each of them pays huge fees, in many

1433 cases perhaps a third of their professional income going to 1434 malpractice insurance.

There is no such insurance program for appraisers as underwriters have widely appreciated the fact that there is no professional standard as yet and secondly, the amount of damage that one appraiser can do financially is so much greater.

Many of the institutions that you looked at in your investigation were put out of business by one appraiser and ironically, the appraisers who got the highest fees were the ones that did the most damage because it was the only time the client really appreciated the value added by the appraiser was when he got a fraudulent appraisal, he was willing to pay him for it. If he got an honest appraisal, he probably wasn't willing to pay him for it.

So you have a complete different set of circumstances here in that the insurance is not available and the amount of damage that can be done is incredible in terms of the total dollar values that are involved.

In this case, the Federal government does not insure doctors against their mistakes. The doctors are having to do that themselves and having a great deal of difficulty doing it I might add.

But in this case, the Federal government does insure institutions and what we are really talking about is not

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1458 just appraisal forms, we are talking about an entire change 1459 in the business culture which has gone for at least 40 years 1460 using appraisers as tools, as controllable misinformation sources in order to go ahead and justify what they wanted to do from a transaction standpoint and totally subverted the 1462 1463 function of the appraiser as a check and balance on the 1464 judgment of the underwriter.

So we are talking about a massive impact that has to be made on the lending fraternity here in terms of how they regard the appraisal as part of the lending underwriting process. That requires the clout that the Federal government has, not a group of volunteers that meet in Chicago or Washington twice a year to discuss how many angels on the head of a pin relative to appraisal theory.

The volunteers have moved at a glacial pace and although many of them are man of good will and many of them are man of great competence, they have not been able to maintain their constituency and the dues paying power of their membership at a level where they can enforce their own standards.

The appraiser that caused the damage to Beverly Hills Savings and Loan still has his designation. I was just testifying recently in a securities fraud case in which all of the appraisals had been altered and not only was the appraisal of the acquiring company on a roll-up exaggerated, every

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1483| appraisal of the apartment projects being acquired was understated except one which happened to be owned by the syndicator's son which was appraised correctly and highly.

In that case, there was an official from one of the appraisal organizations who condoned that and said that they were a little sloppy but that education would solve all of that. I can't believe that. Not one of the MAIs that had signed any of those appraisals have yet been called to task for that work.

Mr. BARNARD. That is very contrary to what you see in the CPA industry when you find faulty audits as have occurred in several of the big, big bank failures, the agencies have actually brought litigation against those CPAs and have extracted large, large fines because the fact is that their audits or their certifications did not measure up.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. I have been called in on at least a dozen cases of institutional financial where the lawyers were going to sue the appraisers only to discover that their insurance is written on a discovery basis and as soon as there was a hint that there was a problem, the malpractice coverage had been cancelled before there was official discovery and as a result there was no coverage.

Mr. BARNARD. Mr. Spratt, do you have any questions? Mr. SPRATT. We had testimony last week and I am sorry I am late and first let me apologize but I assure you I read your

testimony and I appreciated your comments just then, we had testimony last week from MGIC and also testimony from a relocation service.

The relocation service introduced the idea of quality control over the appraisers they retained by using a variance analysis on the appraisal results and granted, they are able to use such a variance analysis more easily than a lending institution would be able to implement such a program because they make a quick turnaround sale of the properties they take in for relocation purposes.

But have you given any thought or study to some sort of system for variance analysis or quality control over the selection and use of appraisers which are lending institutions insured by the government might be required to maintain so that examiners could come in and check the quality control log to see if appraisers of recognized ability were being used?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Yes. There are all kinds of those studies that have been done. At the universities we have several different types of market comparison systems which are virtually automatic and much more reliable than the appraisal element but which have never been introduced.

With the right data base, I can do a single family appraisal for about five bucks that is much more reliable than the one you can get from the guy in the field but the

1533 industry doesn't really want to hear about that for obvious 1534 reasons.

There has been a good study just done down here at the 1535 1536 University in Richmond, I am trying to think of the name, 1537 what is the major university in Richmond, Virginia?

Mr. SPRATT. University of Richmond.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. University of Richmond, okay.

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Mr. SPRATT. Is it VPI, Virginia Tech?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. No, University of Richmond and they analyzed 350 appraisals and appraisers and so forth in terms of the bias and it was incredible. Statistically they obviously knew what the transaction price of the single family home was before they did their appraisal because they never came under it. You can't do that by accident.

Theoretically, you should be above or below it 50 percent of the time. The chi square showed that that almost never happened. There was a distinct bias in the appraisal. So those methods exist and the industry doesn't want to hear about them nor do they want to try them.

I have worked with MGIC from the outset. I wrote the 1554 original briefs as a graduate student for Max karl as we went into the various states so I have tracked on that very closely.

1557 Mr. SPRATT. Have you been retained by any savings and loan

associations, banks or other lenders or purchasers of real estate mortgages to develop systematic appraisals?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Not before the fact. I am working for First Republic currently but in general, lenders don't want to see honest appraisers coming along the track. You can kill an awful lot of good deals that way.

Mr. BARNARD. He is a former banker. I am glad for that reason.

[Laughter.]

Mr. GRAASKAMP. The only time our firm gets called in is when one of the major banks has a proposal before them from a good customer, a relationship as they say, and they don't want to tell them ''no'' so they let me do it for them.

Mr. SPRATT. One of my continuing concerns has been the examiner coming into an institution for an examination cold on the facts, opens a loan file and if that loan is not delinquent, if it is not manifestly under collateralized, if it is not made to somebody who has defaulted in the bank or other nearby banks in the past, it is likely to be approved even though it is grossly under collateralized, even though the interest may have been packaged into the principal and loaned up front to the borrower and the appraisal if it is well done, if the brochuremanship is there, if it is on a nice letterhead and if there are apparent comparables to support it will only lead the examiner to put the file back

1583 in the cabinet and go on to other files that are red 1584 flagged.

What can we do to give the examiner better insight into where there are incipient loan problems and that there is under collateralization despite, notwithstanding, an apparent appraisal? What can we give him externally in the bank or the S&L that would allow him to detect those appraisals that are not reliable and likely won't pan out if the loan goes bad?

Mr. GRANSKAMP. I think that the reason R41-C died was internal pressure in the Home Loan Bank because the loan officer had to sign the appraisal and say that he had read it, for one thing, and that he agreed with the assumptions and conclusions for another. and I think that made R41-C totally unacceptable to the lending officer because he now would be accountable along with the appraiser for the product and if you wanted to do one thing, it would be to make somebody accountable in the bank for the appraisal.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, if that accountability breaks down though, if somebody bets on the come and believes that real estate will keep inflating and they will be bailed out of another appraisal, you still have the problem and I am trying to bolster the roll of the third party which comes in and makes an objective appraisal of the situation and is able to tell when somebody hasn't been accountable, somebody

1608 has fudged the appraisal.

Let me give you one idea and ask you if it is practical since you have worked on developing systems. I used to try condemnation cases for the State Highway Department, also, and when we did an interstate appraisal or a major road appraisal, major road condemnation, we would obviously retain certain appraisers.

The Highway Department was pretty scrupulous about whom they retained and the Federal government was pretty scrupulous. They review appraisers, demanded that we obtain quality appraisers, that their work be of a high quality and there was a lot of variance analysis involved.

One of the first things we required was a sales brochure and extensive documentation of all relevant comparable sales within a certain period of time. We had criteria for what was relevant and comparable, but we catalogued any kind of comparable sale in the vicinity of a certain stretch of that interstate before we undertook to do any work and then we drew off those catalogues, the appraisers drew off that data bank and referenced those documented, demonstrated comparables in defending the values that they derived for various parcels of property.

Would it be impractical today to require lenders to maintain a data bank of comparables so that the examiner could go and check the comparables to see if the appraiser

had chosen the right comparables or had chosen all the
comparables and considered all comparable sales relevant to
a particular piece of property?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. I think that is a part of it. The problem today is that comparable sales are no longer a really good reliable tool. Theoretically we would all like to use that as a base but most of the prices as reported are now engineered prices where the CPAs on both the buyer and the seller's standpoint have come to terms as to how to structure it most favorably for corporate accounting purposes, for the Internal Revenue Service, for partnership purposes, et cetera and therefore, very few of the major transactions, the price as reported is not a reliable price.

In fact, what often is reported is the price on the offer to purchase and those of us who are in the business know the real deal gets negotiated sometime between the offer to purchase and the closing and the closing price is not reported and quite often today, you really make up the difference on the adjustments on the closing price for everything from toxic waste to other attributes in the deal.

So the only problem with that is that the gross comparable sales price can be very misleading and therefore, judicial selection, shall we say, by the bank or by the appraisers would continue.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, a good comparable data sheet includes

the information as to how the appraiser established the actual purchase price.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. The adjustments are really tough. The theory relies on cash equivalent price but it is getting tougher and tougher to figure out what the cash equivalent price was.

Mr. SPRATT. Because there are so many exogenous factors.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Too many other variables going on. The other thing is that there are so many intangibles being traded. For example, one of my major cases right now is the Boca Raton Hotel case being assessed by the Boca Raton assessor at the gross sales price and yet you bought a going business that had all kinds of personalty, which had a book of business of future conventions, which had in this case the Boca Raton club in which people pay exorbitant fees per year just for the right to go and spend money there and so forth and a lot of that is intangible personal property. How much was really for the real estate in that transaction is really hard to pin down.

Basic case just before the Supreme Court in New Jersey testified which we tried, a regional shopping center, how much of the value of the regional shopping center is in the operating agreement which creates special monopolistic advantages for the majors in exchange for their participating for 30 years, providing parking, chipping into the merchants association

and so forth and so the brick and mortar is worth maybe \$15.00, triple net a month, but people pay \$22.00 to be in essentially what is a joint marketing effort which under the laws in New Jersey is clearly a franchise marketing scheme in which the developer is selling entree to this joint marketing effort rather than a piece of real estate.

Now what is the real estate price, land and building that should be taxed, or what is the collateral value of that? We are getting into some really messy issues on income property which make cash equivalent comparable prices a tough game and therefore, we are much more into lease-by-lease cash flow analysis of the properties which by the way originated at the University of Wisconsin. We, 25 years ago built those first cash flow models which are the precedent today.

So what you have is a sophistication which means appraisals
essentially more income property for the accountants. The fastest growing appraisal firms in the country right now are the Big Eight accounting firms.

Mr. BARNARD. Mr. Craig.

Mr. CRAIG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Graaskamp, the discussion has been fascinating to me and I go back to some of your comments in your opening statement about the lender really being the person calling the tune currently.

Now under this proposed law with the changes going on in

the establishment of standards and certification, I assume,
no, I don't assume, let me ask these questions of you. As
you read the law do you see this as a minimum standard?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. I don't see it as any standard at all.
What you have set up was a board that would establish
standards. That is a critical element. I guess I would
question the membership of the board. I would see that
there should be more outside talent than just the Big Eight
appraisal firms or appraisal agencies. The accountants
should have a major role in it because we are really talking
about financial information and the appraisal has become a
fine art of financial dis-information.

Mr. CRAIG. All right. You are talking about tremendous sophistication and all of the variables that exist.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. There are multiple user groups.

Mr. CRAIG. Go ahead.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. You are talking about multiple user groups. Certainly Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, with their uniform residential appraisal form are coming a long way. Where you go from there, you really have either incompetence or fraud. So that is one user group that has an interest in one sector of the area.

But the really big losses to your major institutions have been on the side of development loans, construction lending and arbitraging really from an apartment house to a

1733 condominium conversion, a company of that sort.

1734 Mr. CRAIG. Can you approach that problem through this law?

1735 Mr. GRAASKAMP. Yes. The advisory board properly
1736 constituted could go a long way to establishing the
1737 standards for that and it is not that difficult. Most of

the stuff is out there if they would follow some of the models.

Mr. CRAIG. Can all of that fit in appraisal standards or are we talking about financial institutions' practices?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Well, financial institution's practices is another problem.

1744 Mr. CRAIG. Yes. What I am hearing from you--

1745 Mr. BARNARD. I think that is covered by the agencies 1746 though.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. I think what we really need is--

Mr. CRAIG. But fraud still goes on.

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Mr. BARNARD. But management practices are determined by the Federal agencies, OCC, Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Reserve.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Chairman, I understand that. I guess what I am trying to get at here in understanding your comments which have been very valuable to me and the sophistication of the problem we are dealing with, I think I know a little bit about that is that this—well, what I am hearing from you is that to the extent of the problem, this may be an effort

in the right direction, it takes out a certain portion of the problem but it is not a cure all to the situation you are referring to.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Let me put it this way. We have a relatively unique situation. Ordinarily, quality and getting your money's worth, a professional fee, should be a demand pull kind of thing. People would want to buy that. In the case of the loan officers, they don't want to buy that. In fact, they would tend to suppress the appraiser that provided that kind of objectivity and criticism.

Mr. CRAIG. And this will change that?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. What you are really doing is giving the appraiser something that he can push off from and push back against the lender whom we can't push back from now. He has no basis. He can't say, "'Hey, I can't do that because I am going to lose my license. I can't make that assumption because here are the standard rules that I am working on.''

The guy in the field wants a standard that he can defend himself with against the other guy that is willing to write anything the lender tells him to write.

Mr. CRAIG. So in other words you are saying that this is going to build a little more backbone?

Mr. GRAASKAMP. It builds backbone.

Mr. CRAIG. But fraud will continue to exist where fraud has always existed.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. That has always been the case at any place.

1784 Mr. CRAIG. All right.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. What I am saying is what we have here is an institutional counter incentive and what we are trying to do is change that institutional counter incentive so that the appraiser can truly be independent and I don't think that the professional organizations that have spoken here with the possible exception of the Society of Real Appraisers have really represented the folks in the field.

I talk to hundreds of them. I teach the American Bankers Associations' real estate finance school. In fact, I am the dean of it. I have taught appraisers from coast to coast.

Our school developed the computer system that they are using.

I listen to them every day and most of the appraisers in the field want this legislation and they feel that the institutional organizations that are speaking for them have other agendas. They are concerned about their power, their political stature. They are being embarrassed by the fact that this is going one.

What is more is they think that, wow, if there is a certification by the Federal government that says this particular individual has passed certain examinations, has met standards, has been working for several years and continues to meet those standards and so forth, maybe they

don't need us as an MAI or an SREA, that a certification by
the Federal government would be a higher standard and
suddenly, their membership starts to wane.

There are many people out there who will not hire a certified appraiser because they don't want the somewhat obsolete dogmatic methodology which is still being taught by those organizations.

So I don't think you have heard from the guy in the field, the honest, competent individual who would like a fair shot at a lending business as well as all the other types of appraisal businesses that there are is in favor of this kind of legislation.

He liked R41-C. He could finally push back against the lender and say, ''Hey, you know, this is the way it should be done and this is the way I am going to do it and your own people say this is the way it should be done' and he had a lever that he could be professional and that is what we are trying to provide here.

Mr. CRAIG. Thank you.

Mr. BARNARD. Professor Graaskamp, I appreciate very much your being here today. It has been very enlightening hearing your testimony. I think it has been well appreciated and certainly we understand the credibility of it because of your profession and your experience in it. Thank you very much and I hope that you will feel free to

1833 give us any suggestions and advice as this legislation goes
1834 forward.

Mr. GRAASKAMP. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BARNARD. Our last panel today will consist of Mr. Walter Bohorfoush, vice president and chief appraiser of the Chevy Chase Savings Bank and Mr. Dominick S. Pompeo who is a real estate appraiser and consultant in Brooklyn, New York, if you gentlemen will take the witness stand.

We also appreciate your patience in waiting so attentively but we can't hear from everybody at the same time. That is one of the problems we have so we have to take them in some order but we do appreciate your being here. Without objection, your entire testimony will be included in the record and if possible, we would like for you to summarize within say ten, 12 or 15 minutes. We will first hear from Mr. Bohorfoush.

EXHIBIT A

CHART A

State Administrators

Use Criteria Developed by the Appraiser Qualification Board to:

Membership: organizations

FOUNDATION

APPRAISAL

Governing Body: Trustees

- and administer examination (before Check education and experience issuing certificates for state certified real estate appraisers)
- 2. Supervise continuing education program for renewal of certificates

supports

Stoddy's

As referenced in article

and

Enforce the Standards developed by the Appraisal Standards Board (with penalties for violation)

Qualification

Appraisal Standards

Board

Appraisal Standards Advisory Council

Board

Appraiser

Developes Criteria

Issues Statements

of Appraisal

Standards

(education,

experience, and comprehensive

to be used by

examinations)

certification of

appraisers

and

qualified

Promotes Use

and

states for the

Interpretations

Issues and

Furnishes to State

Administrators

Promotes Use

and

State and Federal Regulators

Adopt (when appropriate) the Standards Developed by the Appraisal Standards Board

and

praisers (certified by states that use the criteria developed by the Appraiser Restrict Certain Types of Appraisal Services to State Certified Real Estate Ap-Qualification Board)

March 7, 1988

Peter Barash Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs B-377 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515

RE: HEARING ON H.R. 3675, THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL REFORM ACT OF 1987

Dear Mr. Barash:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of Congressman Barnard's Appraisal Reform Bill. On reading the transcript I wish I had talked in succinct bullets rather than a rambling commentary.

However, I did want to comment on the major request of the gentlemen from Marshall and Stevens and Valuation Associates. More appraisal is moving toward large firms, particularly accounting firms and full service real estate firms that operate regionally or nationally, because they can send a large number of personnel into a given area to do a project quickly or scatter personnel to multiple properties of a client throughout the country. They are correct on their request for company licensing because States will use their licensing laws to protect their local appraisers from national competition.

Florida already prohibits appraisals by those who are not licensed in Florida and the license requires three years of prior residency. The alternative is to share the fee with a local appraiser who signs the report as though it were his. Ultimately there should be a provision whereby the Federal Interagency Board can certify a limited number of executives in the private sector and government employees in the public sector to operate in all fifty states without State certification. That will prevent States from being used by local trade associations to restrict competition or fight back against the loss of most high ticket appraisal business to Big Eight accounting firms. Cancellation of a national license will also give the Federal Certification Board an opportunity to punish the national firm that continually prostitutes its good name to pander to investment banking, syndication, or securitization prospecti. Believe me, some of the worst appraisals are being done by some of the old line national firms.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

- TO: The Committee on Government Operations, 100th Congress First Session
- FROM: Professor James A. Graaskamp, Ph.D., SREA, CRE Chairman, Real Estate and Urban Land Economics University of Wisconsin, School of Business Madison, Wisconsin
 - RE: IN SUPPORT OF H.R. 3675 TO ORGANIZE AND CONSOLIDATE FEDERAL MATTERS RELATING TO APPRAISALS IN LEGISLATION TO BE CITED AS REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL REFORM ACT OF 1987.
 - I. Credentials and Bias of the Commentator.
 - II. Statement in Support of Legislation as Drafted.
 - III. Response to Arguments in Opposition to Legislation as Drafted.
 - A. Fragmentation of Appraisal Profession undermines capacity to define standards, certify appraisers, to enforce sanctions, and to finance reform.
 - B. The historical weakness of appraisal organization has been and will be exploited by the powerful political organizations who represent primary customers for appraisal services and who have a vested interest in preserving a compliant appraisal trade with the trappings of independence.
 - C. There is a traditional, pervading anti-appraisal bias of mortgage loan officers who are represented by the powerful alliance of significant lobby groups including the ABA, USS&L, MBA, NAR, and NAHB at both Federal and State levels.
 - D. Real estate transactions and developments are driven by the commissions and fees of the deal makers rather than effective demand for space, which is the subject matter of appraisal. If accounting could trace the source and application of mortgage funds, it is probable that the losses of FDIC and FSLDIC represent the fees paid those who would oppose rigorous appraisal.
 - E. Citizens can sue doctors, lawyers, and accountants, who must finance malpractice claims with huge private insurance premiums and lose their licenses. However, the federal taxpayer will fund the deficits of FDIC and FSLDIC caused by negligent loan officers and compliant appraisers. Who will pay the employees of the defunct lender or the property owner whose net worth is crushed by an over supply of unneeded, newly built, competitive space?
 - F. The need for efficient allocation of capital, safety of the depositor and established real estate investor, as well as protection against insider profits in the banking industry, require congressional action on H.R. 3675 as drafted.

Committee on Government Operations Page Two February 25, 1988

I. Credentials and Bias of the Commentator.

Our presentation to the committee is prompted by a career in developing appraisal theory, practice, and education, and not as a member of any professional group. We are here at our own expense other than travel monies provided by the University outside funds as the Dean of the University of Wisconsin Business School felt that educators have a significant vested interest in advancing contemporary methods and education for the appraisal process.

The resume in Appendix A will speak for itself, but it should be noted that we have received the highest awards for appraisal education and improvements to appraisal theory from the Society of Real Estate Appraisers, the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, and Lambda Alpha, the national honorary fraternity for urban land economics. of our consulting activity involves the use of appraisal in litigation, securities fraud, pension real estate, and bank lending on commercial investment properties. We have read hundreds of appraisals for investment properties by all the major appraisal firms on properties located from coast to coast. The general quality is from poor to average. Our conclusion has been that the majority of clients find appraisal mysterious, manipulative, and hopefully a tool for advocacy. The fees are too low for a professional piece of work because the clients seldom perceive the value added by careful research of the real estate market and the property. The lender will require at least one percent (1%) of loan proceeds for fire insurance in case the collateral should burn down but would never spend one percent (1%) of project cost to be reasonably certain the project would rent up. But the rental market is the true source of collateral value; many lenders today can only hope that their real estate interest burns down.

Our bias is that appraisal reform must be brought about by demand pull so that major clients for appraisal services, such as lenders, pension funds, and public agencies acquiring properties by eminent domain must be <u>forced</u> to recognize their own economic self-interest and to purchase responsible appraisal services at prices that justify responsible, professional appraisal work.

II. Statement of Support for H.R. 3675 of Real Estate Appraisal Reform Act of 1987.

Sound appraisal practices are critical to the security of our financial institutions and pension programs as well as the efficient allocation of capital in our economy. Sound appraisal practice is a fulcrum of social equity in matters of real estate taxation, eminent domain compensation, and allocation of costs and benefits of public infrastructure. Nevertheless, the appraisal process is controlled by 19th century economic theory, regulatory anarchy, and self-serving clients who desire

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advocacy rather than objectivity from presumably independent appraisers. To talk of appraisal reform is to expect massive business culture reform and social engineering of mind sets, economic interests, and juvenile concepts of enterprise that can only be accomplished by Federal intervention. With time, the Federal role of creating objective review of appraisal standards and certification requirements could be returned to the private sector once the real estate industry had learned it could survive with truly independent, professional appraisal services.

The creation of a Federal Interagency Appraisal Council is a timely and critical catalyst for much needed reform of the appraisal process, which has become parochial, paralyzed by internal, self-serving political struggles, and subverted by the investment industry to protect the fees of loan officers rather than the funds of savers. None of the Federal regulators as individual agencies have been able to withstand the internal political pressures created by the regulated in order to establish meaningful reforms of appraisal methods, the appraisal role in the lending process, and the independent role of the appraiser as a check on counterproductive incentives to make marginal loans. diverse interests of the Council would prevent a travesty such as the recent repudiation of R-41C by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. arguments presented by Chairperson Dennis Wall were that appraisals performed to the standards required of R-41C were not cost effective in terms of competitive costs relative to the banking system, a statement which is no less astonishing when you consider that the lenders expect a Federal Agency and Congress to pay the \$25-50 billion loss which can be attributed to the implicit conspiracy of loan officers/developers/ These forces would have more difficulty subverting a appraisers. Council of diverse interests and constituencies. In the future, the Council can be expanded to include the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Highway Department, and other agencies involved in eminent domain acquisitions.

Of critical importance for implementation is the time pressure applied in the proposed legislation to provide appraisal standards and certification standards for review within twelve months of enactment and for installation within eighteen months. Any effort by the private industry will be deliberately stalled and extended for reasons to be discussed below. The enormous funding required for putting an adequate system in place is covered by a Federal loan for \$19 million which could never be assembled by the private sector in a timely fashion. The historical volunteer efforts of the private professional appraisal groups have worked at a glacial pace and is a significant factor in the current vacuum of appraisal standards and enforcement. Where would the appraisal industry raise \$19 million to fund a huge two-year effort? How soon could the private industry have an effective program without the money to employ full-time professionals to inaugurate the program? Only a Federal Council can enforce collections of fees and charges to

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support long-term funding of the program as contemplated by the legislation. The industry admits the cost to penalize abusers with existing designations has been a prime factor in the breakdown of private enforcement sanctions, so where would the money be found to install and to impose regulation if States fail to act as required by the industry proposal? It is important that a centralized Federal Council can operate to certify and to sanction those who abuse if the States fail to act since most States will fail to act for reasons discussed below. Nevertheless, States should be given the opportunity to be responsible legislators.

III. Response to Arguments in Opposition to Legislation as Drafted.

The appraisal profession is fragmented and lacks the institutional capacity to define standards, to certify appraisers, or to enforce sanctions on those who abuse designations. The current effort of eight appraisal organizations to create a foundation and model of self-discipline in the image of the certified public accountant is doomed to delay, dilution, and defeat for lack of funds to pay full-time staff, lack of consensus within a profession that has fought merger for years, and lack of legal clout to control its customers or designated members.

Appraisal reform is a Legislative issue that will generate significant resistance from a variety of trade organizations who have a vested interest in the status quo as stated above. None of these professional groups speak for the practicing appraisers in the field who have integrity and competence and who need and desire Federal Assistance to protect their independence and objectivity from mortgage lenders, real estate brokers, builders, and developers. Congress should recall that the Independent Society of Real Estate Appraisers has testified in favor of H.R. 3675 because these appraisers recognize that the professional organizations cannot impose sanctions without a power of subpoena, disclosure, and freedom from counter suits against those appraisers who pander to those parts of the industry that make their living from fees, commissions, and salaried bonuses based on volume. The position of the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers (AIREA) is totally compromised because it is dominated by its parent organization, The National Association of Realtors, and because many designated members of AIREA are loan officers rather than independent appraisers.

We submit that the goals of most professional appraisal organizations to maintain their prestige, control of standards, and cash income from membership is in conflict with the goals of its competent individual members who are unable or unwilling to do appraisals for mortgage lenders at the cost of objectivity and independence. We have talked to dozens of designated members who believe that Federal involvement is the only hope for realistic reform and for public sanctions against tractable appraisers. Appraisers who think for themselves recognize the platitudes of the professional societies as the conditioned response of American business to any suggestion of government regulation.

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There are natural institutional disincentives for thorough and objective appraisals which have been discussed in a symposium conducted by the Lincoln Institute in Cambridge, and a monograph on that subject, which we prepared for that symposium, is provided in Appendix B. There is a deep anti-appraisal bias among mortgage loan officers who state that appraisals are a necessary evil for regulatory purposes. The appraisal guidelines issued in January, 1988 by the FDIC, Federal Reserve and Controller of Currency reveal this bias blatantly in the statement

"...undue reliance should not be placed upon the collateral value in lieu of an adequate assessment of the borrower's repayment ability..."

The lenders issue non-recourse loans on commercial properties and yet disregard the reliability of cash flow from the property as the source of repayment. Even the President of the American Institute, Terrell R. Oetzel, commented editorially in the December, 1987 issue of The Appraiser, as follows:

On August 10, 1987, the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 was signed into law. This act directed the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to implement appraisal standards consistent with the appraisal standards of the federal banking agencies. Quite frankly, the federal banking agencies do not have any appraisal standards. Therefore, the Federal Home Loan Bank had to withdraw their proposed rule (R41-C).

If the bankers and mortgage bankers sincerely wanted to improve mortgage loss ratios, they could have moved toward competitive equality by adopting the standards set by R41-C. Training of auditors to look for standardized appraisal methods that were the same for all members in all states would facilitate audit efficiency, appraiser understanding of his assignment, and consistent documentation for mortgage finance in the national capital markets. Instead bankers forced a rule that allows every institution to have their own definition of a prudent appraisal policy - the same rule that will cost the Federal Government \$25-50 billion dollars to refinance FDIC and FSLDIC.

Defeat of rigorous appraisal standards is a major policy, albeit unwritten, of The American Bankers Association (ABA), U.S. Savings and Loan League (USSLL), The Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA), The National Association of Realtors (NAR), and the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB). We have taught hundreds of their members over the years and we are currently the Nominal Dean of Real Estate Finance courses for the ABA on the University of Wisconsin Campus each July. Few of these students are interested in learning how to critique an appraisal and they all know how to shop an appraisal for the right value commitment by the appraiser.

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These same professional real estate associations control state legislative committees and generally have great influence in the Office of the Governor of each state, so that if they are unable to frustrate H.R. 3675 by crippling amendments or outright defeat, they will dilute and delay state legislation necessary to put permanent certification and enforcement into operation at the state level. We would suggest to you that if it were possible to retrace the source and application of all mortgage funds that have gone awry, that brokerage commissions, lender fees, developer profits and leasing commissions, and other profit centers would represent the \$25-50 billion that will be funded eventually by the Federal Government Agency insuring the lending institution. No wonder so many sectors of the real estate industry fear rigorous appraisals and objective market studies as a test of any transaction.

The sanctimonious defenders of American tradition argue that lawyers, doctors, and accountants are not regulated by the Federal Government, but then those who are hurt by the negligence of lawyers, doctors, and accountants can sue for damages, sue to withdraw their licenses, and collect from insurance resources that do not include billions of federal dollars. Who does the depositor or the out-of-work employee of a bankrupt financial institution sue for damages done by an appraiser? How often does an appraisal organization successfully remove the designation of its own member? Who but the Federal Government provides significant insurance for the damages of malpractice by the loan officer and his implicit conspiracy with the borrower and the appraiser?

The conventional wisdom is that economic progress requires risk taking and the real estate industry lenders want Congress to take all the risks. At the moment the Federal Government lacks the laws and administrative powers to punish even the most fraudulent judgments by loan officers, appraisers, and borrowers. Another conventional wisdom of American business culture is that those who pay the piper get to call the tune and in real estate mortgage lending Congress and the tax payers are expected to pay the piper. Therefore, the taxpayer has every right to require real estate appraisal reform by H.R. 3675. The citizen has every right to impose banking rules which promote efficient allocation of scarce capital, which provide safety incentives for savers, and which prevent insider profits more blatant than those in the stock market.



JAMES A. GRAASKAMP

PROFESSIONAL DESIGNATIONS

SREA, Senior Real Estate Analyst, Society of Real Estate Appraisers

CRE, Counselor of Real Estate, American Society of Real Estate Counselors

CPCU, Certified Property Casualty Underwriter, College of Property Underwriters

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Urban Land Economics and Risk Management - University of Wisconsin

Master of Business Administration, Security Analysis - Marquette University

Bachelor of Arts - Rollins College

ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL HONORS

Chairman, Department of Real Estate and Urban Land Economics,
School of Business, University of Wisconsin
Urban Land Institute Research Fellow
University of Wisconsin Fellow
Omicron Delta Kappa
Lambda Alpha - Ely Chapter
Beta Gamma Sigma

William Kiekhofer Teaching Award (1966) Larson Teaching Award (1985)

Alfred E. Reinman, Jr. Award - Society of Real Estate Appraisers (1986)
Charles B. Shattuck Memorial Award, AIREA (1987)
Urban Land Institute Trustee
Research Committee - Pension Real Estate Association (PREA)
Richard T. Elv Real Estate Educator Award from Lambda Alpha

Richard T. Ely Real Estate Educator Award from Lambda Alpha Homer Hoyt Foundation Fellow

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Dr. Graaskamp is the President and founder of Landmark Research, Inc., which was established in 1968. He is also cofounder of a general contracting firm, a land development company, and a farm investment corporation. He is formerly a member of the Board of Directors and treasurer of the Wisconsin Housing Finance Agency. He is currently a member of the Board and Executive Committee of First Asset Realty Advisors, Inc., a subsidiary of First Bank Minneapolis. He is the designer and instructor of the Urban Land Institute (ULI) School of Real Estate Development and the American Bankers Association (ABA) National School of Real Estate Finance. His work includes substantial and varied consulting and valuation assignments such as investment counseling to insurance companies and banks, court testimony as an expert witness and the market/financial analysis of various projects, both nationally and locally, for private and corporate investors and municipalities. Currently is a member of Salomon Brothers Real Estate Advisory Board.

APPENDIX B

See James A. Graaskamp Collection of Teaching Materials

I. Manuscripts

A. Published Books

12. 1984 Real Estate Valuation Colloquium:

A Redefinition of Real Estate
Appraisal Precepts and fractices

Chapters 3 and 14 by James A. Graaskamp

"The Need for Redefinition and Reform of the Appraisal Process" (Chap. 3)

and

"Industrial Constraints on Redefinition and Reform of The Appraisal Process" (Chap, 14)